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Abstract. Access control systems are nowadays the first line of defence of mod-
ern IT systems. However, their effectiveness is often compromised by policy
miscofigurations that can be exploited by insider threats. In this paper, we present
an approach based on machine learning to refine attribute-based access control
policies in order to reduce the risks of users abusing their privileges. Our approach
exploits behavioral patterns representing how users typically access resources
to narrow the permissions granted to users when anomalous behaviors are de-
tected. The proposed solution has been implemented and its effectiveness has been
experimentally evaluated using a synthetic dataset.
Keywords: Access control, machine learning, policy adaptation, insider threat,
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1 Introduction
Data are recognized as the most vital asset of an enterprise and, thus, their protection
is of paramount importance. Access control systems are typically employed as the first
line of defence for the protection of data as they guarantee that only authorized users
can gain access to sensitive resources. Over the past few years, Attribute-Based Access
Control (ABAC) [1] has gained in popularity due to its flexibility and expressiveness,
allowing the specification of fine-grained and context-aware access control policies.
Despite this flexibility and expressiveness, ABAC (and access control in general)
has an intrinsically static nature that makes it difficult to adapt policies in order to timely
response to critical events, e.g. a cyber attack. At the same time, policies can become
out-of-dated quickly, thus requiring continuous, manual maintenance, which makes
policy management and administration a cumbersome and error-prone task. These issues
can lead to policy misconfigurations that leave organizations exposed to attacks against
data confidentiality and integrity.
A study conduced by SANS in 2017 on threats against sensitive data4 showed that
insider threats are the top concern for organizations, followed by ransomware and denial
4 https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/
sensitive-data-risk-2017-data-protection-survey-37950
of service attacks. Insider threats are current or former employees, contractors or business
partners who have or had authorized access to the organization’s network, system or
data, and intentionally exceeds or misuses their privileges in a manner that negatively
affected the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the organization’s information
or information system [2]. Thus, organizations need to reinforce their access control
systems with procedures to identify policy misconfigurations that could be exploited by
an insider threat and update the policies to prevent such exploitations.
Detecting and preventing insider threats by analyzing access control policies and
monitoring user behavior have been an active area of research. Common approaches
rest on rule mining techniques to discover harmful exploitable policy faults [3,4] or on
monitoring systems based on behavioral models to detect insider threats [5,6,7,8]. Other
works [9,5] have also exploited knowledge from access control policies to detect insider
threats. However, these approaches only aim at threat detection and do not focus on
the adaptation of access control policies. To date, only a few works (e.g., [10,11]) have
exploited user behavior to generate and adapt access control policies. However, these
approaches either require human intervention for policy update [10] or build models that
do not properly discriminate behaviors of different types of users [11].
Contribution. In this paper, we propose an approach based on machine learning to
dynamically refine policies to prevent misconfiguration exploitation. The proposed
approach allows the refinement of access control rules according to behavioral features
monitored at run-time. The designed system, named ML-AC, exploits a white-box
decision learning approach whose aim is to learn behavioral profiles of users accessing
resources so to accurately refine policies. There might exist different behavioral profiles,
here called classes of interaction, that can be determined based on the analysis of
contextual knowledge that concerns users and resources. Such knowledge has proven
to be a valuable source of information for approaches devoted to improve insider threat
detection and access control [6,12].
ML-AC uses access pattern knowledge learned at run-time to introduce controls on
behavioral features into access control rules to avoid abuse of granted rights. Behavioral
features refine access policies by introducing controls like frequency of access, amount
of data, location, etc. By building an access control knowledge model, this work poses
the basis towards machine-assisted administration procedures to support timely changing
of access rights.
Paper structure. Section 2 provides a motivating example. Section 3 provides an
overview of ML-AC and details how machine learning is empowering access control.
Section 4 describes the implementation and evaluation of the performance of ML-AC.
Section 5 concludes the paper and outlines directions for future work.
2 Motivating Example
To outline our approach, we introduce an ABAC system managing accesses to software
projects within an organization where users’ permissions depend on their role and on the
projects they are assigned to.
Let us assume an access control policy allowing users assigned to role junior manager
to read resources of type R1. However, only junior managers working on ProjectA and
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from Department 1 can actually access those resources. This policy can be represented





equal ("read", action/id) && equal ("R1", resource/type)
&& equal ("Junior manager", subject/role)
&& equal ("Department1", subject/department)
&& equal ("ProjectA", subject/project))}
Intuitively, our sample policy consists of a policy element (policy1) comprising a
permit rule (rule1) whose target defines an access condition built on attributes
describing which action a certain subject can perform on a resource.
Let us assume that Bob, a junior manager of Department 1, attempts to read a






It is easy to observe that the attributes in the request match the rule target, thus yielding
a permit decision.5
Suppose now that Bob attempts to retrieve a large amount of sensitive project
documents without a plausible reason. As the previous request exemplifies, policy1
would allow him to do so regardless of how many documents he has retrieved. This
situation, however, may indicate that the junior manager is abusing his access privileges
for personal interests and benefits (e.g., to sell the documents to a competitor).
These insider threats cannot be prevented by existing access control systems. The
main problem lies in the fact that access control is static in the sense that the enforced
access conditions do not change dynamically according to user behaviour. We argue that
contextual features, such as the number of accesses and amount of accessed data, should
be taken into account in access decision making. For instance: Could a user perform
multiple read queries in a given time window? Could a user access large amounts
of data? Failing to answer these questions can lead to neglect anomalous behaviour
representing the abuse of granted access privileges from insider threats.
To reduce the risks of users abusing their privileges, we need to empower access
control with proactive measures that adapt policies according to user behavior. Specifi-
cally, our goal is to dynamically refine access control policies based on user behaviour
monitored at run-time by narrowing granted privileges.
To achieve this goal, we need to equip access control systems with a means to build
user profiles representing how users normally access resources and use those profiles to
dynamically refine access rules. This requires extracting contextual features that capture
5 We overlook combining algorithm deny-unless-permit as it yields permit if the enclosed

















Fig. 1. The ML-AC system
the behavior exhibited by users accessing a specific set of resources by means of a
selected set of operations.
For the sake of exemplification, let us assume that contextual features
feature/NumberOfReadsPerHour and feature/BytesReadPerHour are monitored
by the system and can be checked via new attributes in access rules. In particular, it is
observed that every hour junior managers typically access at most 14 project documents




equal ("read", action/id) && equal ("R1", resource/type)
&& equal ("Junior manager", subject/role)
&& equal ("Department1", subject/department)
&& equal ("ProjectA", subject/project))}
&& less-than (feature/BytesReadPerHour, 345.6)
&& less-than (feature/NumberOfReadsPerHour, 14)
Intuitively, policy2 narrows the access conditions of policy1 through contextual features
by imposing additional constraints on how much and how often resources are typically
accessed by junior managers. Consider, for instance, the case where Bob attempts to ac-
cess 50 project documents within 10 minutes. Based on the updated policy, this behavior
would be deemed as anomalous and thus denied, preventing Bob to access all documents.
3 Adaptive Access Control
In this section, we introduce ML-AC, a system for adaptive access control that aims
to reduce the risks of users abusing their privileges. Figure 1 presents the ML-AC
architecture. It comprises the following components:
– Authorization Server is a standard ABAC infrastructure à la XACML based on
PEP/PDP.
– Policy Administration Point (PAP) features the proactive policy refinement function-
alities proposed in this work.
– Monitoring System supervises the whole system and provides the information needed
to build behavioral profiles used by Policy Administration in its refinement process.
Once an access request is received by the Authorization Server (step 1), it is evaluated
following typical PEP/PDP evaluation frameworks. If access is granted (i.e., a permit
decision is returned) by the Authorization Server, the request, together with the cor-
responding behaviour provided by the Monitoring system, is forwarded to the PAP
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(step 2) to determine whether it is anomalous. The PAP dynamically refines the access
control policies based on the user behavior and enforce them in the Authorisation Server
(steps 3-4). Administrators are informed of the changes (step 5).
Our contribution lies in the Policy Administration component. Specifically, we equip
PAPs with the Contextual Behaviour Learning component, which is responsible to build
user profiles according to the monitored behavior and refine access control policies based
on those profiles. The Concept Drift component detects the evolution of the learned user
profiles and inform the Contextual Behavior Learning component when new behaviors
are detected (step 3).
In the remaining, we introduce our representation of behavioral models and present
the mechanics of the Contextual Behaviour and Concept Drift components.
3.1 Behavioral Model
To build the behavioral models used to identify anomalous accesses, we introduce the
notion of user behavior. Behaviours, denoted as b, represent how users are utilizing
resources. They are defined in terms of the attributes forming access requests (i.e., user,
resource and action) and of any contextual knowledge features that can be exploited by
the access control system for decision making (e.g., working time, working location,
types of activities). Formally, a behaviour is defined as:
b , 〈Au1 , . . . , Aum, Ao1, . . . , Aoh, Ar1, . . . , Ark, . . . Ac1 . . . Acz〉




y resources and A
c
z the context. An
attribute is an expression of form A , name op value , where op is a relational operator
(e.g., =, >) between an attribute name and a value from the attribute’s codomain. For
instance, the following behaviour (we shorten attribute names for ease)
b1 = 〈role = jnr-mng, act = read, res = R1 ,#byte = 250,#read = 10〉
corresponds to the access request reported in Section 2, where #byte and #read are
contextual features provided by the Monitoring System.
Behaviors are grouped into so-called class of interactions. Each class represents a
group of homogeneous behaviours (i.e., whose representation involves the same set of
attribute name) that are considered normal. We assume that the set of initial classes are
defined according to the access policy rules, hence on the basis of the controls on user,
action and resource attributes. Changes at runtime to the classes are managed by the
Concept Drift component (Section 3.3).
3.2 Contextual Behavior
Our approach builds behavioral profiles of normal accesses in the form of class of
interactions. To determine to which class of interaction a given behavior belong, we
relies on Random Forest (RF) [14], where each RF is used to characterize a class of
interaction. Based on this matching, the knowledge on the corresponding contextual
features is used to refine access control policies.
5
Learning Practicalities. Given a class of interactions Ci, our goal is to recognize
whether a user behavior bi is similar to those represented by Ci or not, i.e. whether bi is
anomalous. Practically, being bi a potentially anomalous behavior, we cannot assume it
will always match (the attributes of) Ci. It follows that this problem cannot be addressed
as a multi-class classification (labels would be represented by the classes of interactions
and our goal would be to determine if the label of a test sample bi is Ci or another Cj ,
with i 6= j), but as a One Class Classification (OCC) problem [15] for each of class
of interaction Ci individually.
Solutions for the OCC problem are numerous. However, being our goal to obtain
learning outputs that can be used to refine policies, we opted for the white-box approach
of RF. Specifically, each RF is an ensemble of Decision Tree (DT) each of which
models the conditions on the attributes identifying the normal behaviors of a class.
Each DT produces an output of the form of antecedent⇒ consequent rules [16]. The
antecedent consists of logical conjunctions stating under which conditions a behavior
can be classified as normal or anomalous, as indicated by the consequent.
It is worth noting that each DT produces its own output, leading to potential incon-
sistencies. For instance, let us suppose a RF with three DTs. Given a behavior b, each
DT produces its own decision, e.g. DT1(b) = 1, DT2(b) = 0 and DT3(b) = 1, where 1
and 0 denote normal and anomalous behavior, respectively. To solve this problem RF
relies on a majority vote algorithm among DTs; hence b is classified as normal. Notably,
a final decision can always be guaranteed by using a known RF voting solution [17].
Access Control Refinement. The DT outputs, hereafter called ML-rules, is used to bridge
from the machine learning world to the actual refinement of access control policies.
Practically, they encode the obtained knowledge in terms of additional conditions to
add to the access control policy. The syntax of ML-rules is defined by the following
grammar:
ML-rule ::= Antec⇒ Consec
Antec ::= Cnd {&& Cnd} Cnd ::= name op value
Op ::= = | > | < | ≤ | ≥ | in Consec ::= true | false
where true (resp., false) identifies a normal (resp., anomalous) behavior. The an-
tecedent consists of a conjunctive sequence of conditions, whereas the consequent is a
Boolean value stating whether a behavior satisfying the antecedent is normal or anoma-
lous. For instance, the following ML-rule represents the refinement leading from policy1
to policy2 of the example
role = jnr -mng && act = read && res = R1
&& #read < 14 && #byte < 345.6
⇒ true
Therefore, ML-rules are used to transfer the contextual knowledge learned by the RFs
into the access control policies. Policy refinement occurs on the basis of the conditions
on the contextual features present in an ML-rule (e.g., the #read and #byte above).
Practically, the access control rules to refine correspond to those matching the conditions
on user, action and resource attributes present in the ML-rule. The refined rules contain















Fig. 2. Detection of concept drift
3.3 Concept Drift
After the behavioral models have been build, the system starts monitoring the evolution
of user behaviors to detect concept drifts in order to maintain the RF models accurate
over time. It follows from the RF design that concept drifts can only be detected on the
contextual features.
To this aim, we rely on Olindda [18], a clustering-based approach similar to the one
followed by BBNAC [11]. Olindda uses the well-known k-means algorithm (or one of
its extensions, e.g. k-modes for categorical features) to cluster behaviors of the classes of
interactions and detect the emergence of new classes (aka new clusters) based on the
distance among clusters.
Figure 2(a) depicts a scenario where concept drift can be observed. For instance,
given three classes of interactions C1, C2 and C3, at the beginning just three groups of
user behaviors, respectively the clusters A, B and D of blue-filled shapes, are identified.
After a certain amount of time, the behaviors in the cluster D change to the point that
concept drift is detected: the red-filled shapes. Therefore, these behaviors are used by
the RF modelling the class C3 to update its knowledge accordingly. Additionally, when
behavior like those represented by red cross shapes are observed, i.e. not forming any
cluster, Olindda deems them as anomalies. This is the key assurance to avoid RF to
refine access control policies with conditions allowing anomalous behaviors.
Notably, emerging concepts may overlap among classes leading to difficulties in
their classification. For instance, Figure 2(b) depicts new concepts emerging from the
cluster D that present similarities to both cluster D (circle shapes) and cluster B (square
shape). All emerging concepts like the latter are treated as anomalies.
Divergence in clusters. A key aspect of concept drift is the emergence of sub-clusters
within an existing cluster. Given a class Ci, it may happen that a subset of its users start
behaving significantly different from the remaining users, over time. This would lead to
the discovery of new classes of interactions detailing different behavioral profiles.
Our approach aims to build classes of interactions that are characterized by behav-
iors that are very similar to each other. Therefore, in the light of the new discovered
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Fig. 3. Comparison among ML-AC, BBNAC and ML-ACnok
sub-clusters, we derive two new classes of interaction from Ci, namely Cni and C
o
i ,
representing behavior related to the new and old concepts, respectively. This has the
consequence of introducing a new RF modelling the new class. In order to keep updating
the policy refinements generated by the initial Ci, it is required a layered RF modelling
able to discriminate between the two new classes. Further details are left to future work.
4 Evaluation
To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we have implemented it6 and performed
experiments using a synthetic dataset. The goal of the experiments is to demonstrate
the benefits of combining domain context knowledge (inferred using machine learning)
with knowledge based on access control rules (used to create classes of interaction) for
the detection of anomalies. In particular, we assess the detection accuracy of ML-AC
by analyzing the number of true and false positive. This will allows us to demonstrate
how the refinement based on this detection approach will prevent anomalies to happen a
priori. Note that we do not evaluate the use of machine learning to classify user behavior,
being this extensively reported in the literature (e.g., [19]).
In the experiments, we compared our approach for anomaly prevention with two other
approaches.We took BBNAC [11], the closest approach from the literature. To avoid
bias in the experimentation, we re-implemented BBNAC in Matlab.7 Additionally, we
performed a comparison with ML-ACnok, a variant of ML-AC where a priori knowledge
on the policy is not used. This allows us to better assess the role of contextual knowledge.
Dataset. We generated a synthetic dataset whose data instances represent user behaviors,
under the assumption that there are two classes of interactions. The behaviors are
represented as three-dimensional points and based on numerical features. We generated
over 3000 behaviors, with almost an equal number of normal and anomalous instances.
Intuitively, about 2000 behaviors were used for training, while the rest for testing.
Results. To evaluate the accuracy of the approaches, we computed the ROC curve for
the three evaluated approaches (Figure 3). The ROC curve is a graphical plot we use to
evaluate how well the classifier we defined distinguishes between normal and anomalous
6 The tool is freely available at https://github.com/cybersoton/ml-ac/
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behaviors, based on a varying discrimination threshold (i.e., the value used to deem a
behavior anomalous). Specifically, it shows the true positive rate or TPR (y-axis) against
the false positive rate or FPR (x-axis) with respect to different threshold settings. These
performances can also be reduced to a single scalar value, called area under the ROC
curve (AUC), which represents the probability that a classifier will rank a randomly
chosen anomalous instance higher than a randomly chosen normal instance. This gives
better insights on the number of false positive detected.
As can be seen in Figure 3, ML-AC achieves the best performance. ML-AC signif-
icantly surpasses the others due to the use of a priori knowledge on the policy. This
allows ML-AC to create more accurate profiles and hence to discern more precisely
among groups of behaviors. Specifically, we have that the AUC drops from the 99% of
ML-AC to the 87% and 85% of ML-ACnok and BBNAC, respectively. The main cause
is that both BBNAC and ML-ACnok classify most of the anomalous behaviors of each
class as a normal behavior of the other class.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed ML-AC, an approach to refine and update access policies
in order to eliminate policy misconfigurations that can be exploited by insider threats.
ML-AC builds behavioral models representing the normal usage of resources and ex-
ploits these models at run-time to prevent anomalous accesses. Our approach has been
implemented and validated using a synthetic dataset.
Future work. There are a number of interesting aspects to address as future work. Firstly,
we plan to conduct more extensive experiments based on real-life datasets and measure
the number of refinement applied in practice to the access control policies.
Moreover, we would like to study further the presence of an adversarial attacker [20],
who may try to deceive the machine learning algorithm in order to bypass security
controls. ML-AC employs different machine learning algorithms to achieve its goals,
therefore it may incur in the risk of being subject to adversarial attacks. The definition
of class of interaction may constitute a starting point for devising strategies to hinder
typical attacks such as causative and exploratory. The fact that user behaviors are split
based on the classes, may make the task of deceiving ML-AC quite difficult. Many
anti-adversarial algorithms have been proposed in literature, like those presented in [11]
that effectively mitigate threats related to concept drift.
Another aspect concerns classes of interactions. It might not always be possible to
clearly define those classes based only on the knowledge derived from the context and
access control policies. There may be some classes that should be merged or split, hence
we plan to design a preprocessing step to support the classes definition process.
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